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To place the Chinese in late nineteenth-century Java one must find them first.1 Finding 
them is by no means easy. Until now, scholars of the Chinese in Indonesia have touched on 
this period only lightly.2 Many primary sources remain underexplored, and in some impor­
tant cases they are meager. Aside from peranakan Chinese writings of the late century— 
only now being explored with vigor3—few Chinese records remain. And what is, to my 
knowledge, the best collection has been transmitted to us only indirectly, that is, Liem Thian 
Joe's Riwajat Semarang of 1933, based largely upon the archives of the Chinese Council of 
Semarang and augmented by Liem's own collections and the peranakan talk stories of his 
day.4 A rich store of information may await the collector of oral histories. But one hundred 
years is too long to expect facts to come through undisturbed, especially in large families 
where polygamy and the dispersal of various branches around the world have complicated
1A fuller discussion of the Chinese in late nineteenth-century Java is presented in James Rush, Opium to Java: 
Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 1869-1910 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1990). This sketch draws upon additional materials, but it does not break new ground. Instead, it addresses the 
topic broadly to comport with the symposium for which it was written: 'The Role of the Indonesian Chinese in 
Shaping Modern Indonesian Life." Despite the title, the emphasis here is on central and east Java. Batavia and its 
hinterland are underrepresented, a serious gap because the largest single community of Chinese in Java was 
settled there.
2See G. William Skinner, 'The Chinese Minority," in Indonesia, ed. Ruth T. McVey (New Haven: Human Rela­
tions Area Files, 1963), pp. 97-117; idem, "Java's Chinese Minority: Continuity and Change," Journal of Asian 
Studies, 20 (May 1961): 353-62; Donald E. Willmott, The Chinese of Semarang: A Changing Minority Community in 
Indonesia (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1960); Lea Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of 
the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1916 (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1960); Leo Suryadinata, The Chinese 
Minority in Indonesia (Singapore: Chopmen Enterprises, 1978). Other recent works, like those by Peter Carey, 
have addressed earlier periods; see Peter Carey, "Changing Javanese Perceptions of the Chinese Communities in 
Central Java, 1755-1825," Indonesia, 37 (April 1984), pp. 1-47.
3See Claudine Salmon, Literature in Malay by the Chinese of Indonesia. A Provisional Annotated Bibliography (Paris: 
Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1981) and other works by Salmon, including her article in this 
issue.
4Liem Thian Joe, Riwajat Semarang (Dari Djamannja Sam Poo Sampe Terhapoesnja Kongkoan) (Semarang: Boekhandel 
Ho Kim Yoe, 1933). Liem died in 1963.
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genealogies, and where bankruptcies and contested inheritances have long since divided kin 
from kin and story from story. (To avoid being embroiled in such controversies, Liem Thian 
Joe expurgated the Rizvajat, as he frankly admits.) Lore about the Chinese in Indonesia has 
an importance all its own, but in reconstructing the last century, it must obviously be 
weighed against facts and observations retrieved directly from the times. Where can facts be 
found?
One unequipped to use Javanese sources directly unavoidably turns to the Dutch. As 
Java's industrious colonial masters, they were busy keeping track of things—certain things. 
For example, year by year, their Regeerings Almanak listed by name all of Java's Chinese offi­
cers, residency by residency, district by district. Java's Dutch-appointed Chinese majors, 
captains, and lieutenants were truly influential men who stood between the colonial state 
and its Chinese subjects, and who also dominated the Chinese economy. Therefore, the 
Almanak provides something akin to a demography of power among the Javan Chinese, 
permitting one to place the leading families and, where auxiliary genealogical information is 
available, to trace the rise of some, the demise of others. (The Bes and the Oeis, both based in 
Semarang, are dramatic examples.)
The Koloniale Verslagen—the colonial ministers' voluminous annual reports to parlia­
ment—periodically give population figures for Chinese, although the figures are somewhat 
impressionistic. (It is not clear, for example, who was counted as a Chinese woman.) Never­
theless, its figures permit one, roughly, to place the Chinese population spatially in Java, 
mapping its concentrations and dispersements across the island. After 1875, these popula­
tion figures are given by afdeling (more or less coterminous with a regency) and after 1895, 
by district. The same report gives yearly accounts of the government's revenue farms, and, 
thus, vast amounts of information about regionally based Chinese enterprise—for virtually 
all revenue farms were Chinese-run. Colonial officials in Java generally made it a point to 
keep politicians at home in the dark about certain realities in the colony, the enormous eco­
nomic influence of the Chinese among them. This is probably why the Koloniale Verslagen 
rarely identify the revenue farmers by name. Only occasionally do they acknowledge in 
print that they were Chinese at all. (When they do, however, the facts are telling: the Kolo- 
niaal Verslag for 1875 reveals, for example, that of 922 licensed pawnshops in the East Indian 
possessions in 1874, all but nine were held by Chinese!)5 Knowing the connection between 
government revenue farms and the Chinese, however, makes the Verslagen rich sources for 
charting the health of the Chinese economy region by region. In fact, if one looks carefully, 
the Chinese appear often in the Verslagen. (For example, in appendix A of the Verslag for 
1889 one learns inter alia that there were then twenty-two Chinese furniture makers in 
Kediri, and that in all Java, only fifty-five Chinese were Christian!)
The Chinese can also be found in other official documents. Between 1866 and 1886, for 
example, the colonial government at Batavia published twenty-one or so statutes designat­
ing and expanding Java's authorized Chinatowns; these statutes can now be found in bound 
volumes entitled Staatsbladen van Nederlandsch-lndie. Another example is the massive Onder- 
zoek naar de Mindere Welvaart der Inlandsche bevolking op Java en Madoera (10 vol., 1905-1914), 
in which Chinese economic activities late in the century are examined in the context of a 
perceived decline in the welfare of Java's indigenous population.6
5Dutch East Indies, Koloniaal Verslag, 1875, pp. 164-65.
6Dutch East Indies, Onderzoek naar de Mindere Welvaart der Inlandsche bevolking op Java en Madoera, 10 vols. 
(Batavia: 1905-1914) [hereafter cited as Mindere Welvaart Report].
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The Chinese appear in even greater profusion and sharper focus in the archives of the 
former Dutch Ministry of Colonies. Here rest file upon file of raw materials unedited for 
public consumption, although, it is true, carefully selected for internal perusal. Those un­
familiar with archives and perhaps imagining shelves full of dull reports far removed from 
the nitty-gritty of Java will be surprised to discover the richness and intimacy of these 
sources—the result of bureaucratic procedure. When reporting administrative actions to his 
minister at home, the governor general in Batavia ordinarily appended to his official letter a 
bundle of supporting documents—the advice of his secretariat, of his advisory council (the 
Raad van Indie) and, often, of his administrative subordinates in the field. Thus, alongside 
routine reports from Batavia—reports used to fill the various chapters of the annual Versla- 
gen—came supporting documents for administrative decisions, among them revisions to 
regulations governing Chinese residence and the revenue farms. Many of these documents 
have remained unread until now and are filed permanently with the mailrapport (equivalent 
to a diplomatic pouch) in which they were originally shipped to the Netherlands. Others 
were taken for study and deliberation, then deposited in separate files, by subject, as the 
minister or his staff finished with them. The same thing happened to additional materials 
drawn from the colony at the request of parliament.
Appended to deliberations concerning revenue farms, for example, one finds court 
documents and colonial intelligence reports detailing the business operations of wealthy 
Chinese merchants, audits of their plantations and mills, lists of their real estate holdings, 
notarial acts giving the names of their kongsi partners (and their respective shares in, say, an 
opium farm), and, now and then, descriptions of their private wealth—such as the gems and 
betel boxes treasured by reclusive peranakan women. Although to the modem researcher 
the archive yields its data unsystematically, it does so abundantly.
Even so, Dutch preoccupation with fiscal matters leaves vast areas unexplored. Some of 
these areas may be approached in unofficial Dutch sources, colonial newspapers and 
magazines, plus books offering sketches, memoirs, fiction, and polemics—although here, 
too, economic matters often prevail. The Chinese appear regularly, for example, in the 
Indisch Weekblad voor het Recht, the Indies lawyers' trade paper that reported precedent-set- 
ting cases. Indeed, this is a unique source of published information about the inner work­
ings of Chinese business partnerships—those that had dissolved, that is.7 From newspapers, 
too, the fragments one gathers are more often than not economic—advertisements for this 
toko or that, and announcements like this one from the Javansch Courant, December 10,1872: 
"Ho Tjienio, wife of Tan Tjong Toen, declared bankruptcy on December 6,1872." But news­
papers sometimes reported other news: marriages, deaths, grand events, and crimes involv­
ing the leading Chinese. From two stray notices in 1864 one learns, for example, that Be 
Biauw Tjoan contributed 55 guilders to a school for Chinese orphan boys in Semarang and 
that he owned rice warehouses in Surabaya. (The latter had been robbed.)8 *
Dutch novels, sketches, and "investigative reports" provide glimpses into aspects of 
Chinese social life and behavior unrecorded elsewhere. But because they were written either 
for the amusement of their fellow Dutch or for their edification—more often than not the 
latter—they tend to emphasize the extravagant or the scandalous. Some, like M.T.H. Pere- 
laer's Baboe Dalima (1886) and Isaac Groneman's Uit en over Midden Java (1891) are frankly 
polemical and reflect sinophobia among the Dutch and fears about the Yellow Peril. Yet it is
7In issue no. 1331 of 1888, for example, the Indisch Weekblad van het Recht took up a civil suit involving ten mem­
bers of a kongsi that had been formed to manage the opium farm in Batavia, Krawang, and the Lampongs.
sDe Locomotief, November 25,1864; February 29,1864.
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writers like these who also tell you what people are wearing; take you along to a wedding; 
or walk you down the main street of Chinatown in a provincial capital, as does Louis 
Couperus in The Hidden Force (De stille kracht) (1900). And it is often from them, as well as 
from peranakan sources directly, that one can learn something about those in Java's Chinese 
community who are hardest to find, the women. But keep in mind that Therese Hoven's 
comment about peranakan ladies more or less says it all, "We rarely see them."9
In fact, this is true of most individuals. Many appear in my notes only once: Tan Ing Tjan, 
a convert to Christianity who did not (the news clipping makes a point of remarking) Euro­
peanize his name, died in October 1889.101 know nothing more about him. In the same way, 
the best description of an opium farm auction comes from Semarang; of an opium farm's 
internal structure, from Madiun; and of the private wealth of a Chinese officer, from Kediri. 
The fit is never perfect. Yet, building from sources such as these, one can begin to place the 
Chinese in late nineteenth-century Java.
As far as the Dutch knew, 198,233 Chinese lived in Java in 1878, a little more than half of 
them men. They were massed heavily in Batavia and its immediate environs and in the 
north coast cities of Cirebon, Rembang, Surabaya, and Semarang. With a Chinese popula­
tion of some thirteen thousand, Semarang hosted the second largest community after 
Batavia and was the commercial gateway opening to Central and East Java. Virtually all 
residency capitals contained Chinese populations of a few thousand, with communities 
ranging from several hundred to one or two thousand souls scattered in the district towns 
and beyond. The exception was the Priangan, whose population of Chinese numbered less 
than one thousand. In general, the Chinese were more densely concentrated closer to the 
north coast and the older centers of trade. But by the late 1870s, outside the Priangan, every 
regency in Java had at least a few hundred, including the eastern frontier residencies of 
Probolinggo and Besuki.11
Altogether the Chinese accounted for only one percent or so of the entire population, a 
very small minority indeed. Yet no one living in, say, Rembang at the time would have had 
any trouble finding them or identifying them as Chinese. Chinese men especially were 
completely conspicuous. Every one of them wore a long braid down his back, the mark of 
the Manchus that the Dutch also required of their Chinese subjects. (Men and boys shaved 
the front part of their heads; boys rolled their braids into buns.) Chinese were also required 
to "dress" like a Chinese. Photographs and paintings show Chinese officers in Mandarin- 
style gowns and otherwise depict men wearing pajama like garments of loose shirts and 
robes over wide pants. Thick-soled shoes were also distinctively Chinese.12 Although some 
men living in villages with local wives no doubt assimilated to Javanese ways—and a tiny 
handful, by decree, were made "Dutch" gelijkgestelden—generally speaking, there was no 
mistaking a Chinese male.13 Although officially lumped together with other Foreign
^Therese Hoven, In sarong en kabaai (Amsterdam: L. J. Veen, 1892), p. 93.
111De Indische Tolk van het Nieuws van den Dag, October 15,1889, p. 1.
11Koloniaal Verslag, 1875, app. A, 1879.
12See the photographs and illustrations in Rob Nieuwenhuys (Breton de Nijs), Tempo Doeloe; Fotografische docu- 
menten uit het oude Indie (Amsterdam: E. Querido, 1973); James Rush, Opium to Java ; and Liem, Riwajat.
13The Dutch were extremely reluctant to give Dutch status to Asians. As one member of the Road van Indie noted, 
"For the cunning Chinese here, Dutch nationality would be a 'cover' [dekmantel], just as Christianity is in the 
Philippines." Memorandum and Advice, Road van Indie, April 17,1857, filed in the colonial archives in Verbaal 
no. 22, March 1,1888.
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Orientals—a category that embraced "Arabs," "Moors" and "Bengalis"—in practice, 
Chinese were treated as a special group. They lived under the authority of their own officers 
and enjoyed a mixed legal status: in criminal and civil matters they were subject to codes 
and procedures for Natives; in commercial ones, those for Europeans. At court, Chinese 
officers sat prominently by to advise the Dutch judge.
Every city or town of consequence had its own Chinese quarter (patjinan) and the Chi­
nese were generally required to reside there. These neighborhoods were often set off with 
ornamental gates and were characterized by crowded streets of shop-houses, temples, and 
the family compounds of the better off. (As an observer of Semarang's patjinan remarked in 
1850, 'The tasteful home and pretty gardens of the Chinese Captain are worth a look.")14 
Although a few Chinese were exempted from living in them, and others took advantage of 
lax vigilance here and there, these official ghettos gave the community a clear spatial focus 
in each city and town. They were places apart to Javanese and Dutch alike, where sounds 
and smells, the shape of buildings, and the pace and habits of daily life were strange. In 
smaller towns, too, the Chinese tended to live in clusters, probably in or near a clutch of 
buildings just off the alun-alun, including a few provision shops and the local opium store, 
pawnhouse, and bordello. These city neighborhoods and small-town clusters were the cen­
ters of Chinese life and commerce on Java, and to the Javanese they must have seemed 
something like beehives: busy and dangerous havens, full of honey, from which swarms of 
menacing but useful intruders fanned out daily in a relentless, apparently instinctual, quest 
for livelihood.
It was the intensity and variety of this quest for livelihood that most thoroughly marked 
the Chinese, for they were everywhere "material man." As people of commerce in Java they 
were not unique, of course; Javanese, Dutch, Eurasians, and others, to one degree or 
another, also had a hand in the economy. The Dutch dominated large-scale importing and 
exporting, the heights of the European banking sector, and other activities where industrial 
acumen or privileged access to government concessions gave them an edge, as in railroad 
building. Although already losing their traditional hold, Javanese merchants still carried on 
in the tobacco and textile industries and, on a small scale, in many others. Village men and 
women who provided commodities for market and engaged in petty trade were legion.15 
But where the economy was concerned, the Chinese were ubiquitous and essential. Sooner 
or later everyone doing business in Java had to do business with a Chinese—from the Dutch 
planter needing wagons and tools to the Javanese villager with fruits and eggs to sell. So 
dependent were Europeans and other urbanites on Chinese-provided goods and services 
that daily life itself—as they came to know and enjoy it—was impossible without them. 
Moreover, except for a few schoolmasters, Java's Chinese men—and an untold number of 
the peranakan and indigenous women to whom they were married or related—were almost 
all active in the money economy.
From top to bottom, commerce marked the Chinese. They were shippers, ware­
housemen, and labor contractors; builders and repairmen; and suppliers of all things to town 
and country. They were tinsmiths, leather tanners, and furniture makers. They bought and 
sold real estate, worked timber concessions, and speculated in the plantation economy. They 
organized the manufacture of batik and tobacco products. (In 1877, villagers in Wonosobo
14P. Bleeker, "Fragmenten eener Reis over Java: Reis langs de Noordkust van Midden-Java," Tijdschrift van 
Nederlandsch-Indie 1 (1850): 18.
15On batik, see Christine Dobbin, "From Revenue Farmers to Entrepreneurs: The Chinese in the Javanese Textile 
Industry, 1870-1939." Author's collection. Typescript, n. d.
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still remembered the names of the Chinese who some seventy years before had taught them 
how to cultivate tobacco.)16 The Chinese brought the products of village farmers to mar­
ket—rice, sugar, indigo, cotton, pepper, coconuts, cacao, and soybeans, fruits, ducks, 
chickens, and eggs. They milled rice, tapioca, cotton and sugar; processed kapok and copra 
and castor oil; and manufactured tahu and soy sauce. (Investigators for the Welvaart Onder- 
zoek found fifty Chinese-run kecap "factories" in Surabaya.)17 And, aside from their own 
wares, they supplied indigenous vendors with goods like gambir, salt, trasi, and cooking oil 
for the village trade. As opium farmers they brought opium to everyone; and as, for 
instance, "water buffalo farmers" they took in fees for slaughtering animals and, on the side, 
did a brisk business in hides. Those Chinese who acted as officials were not only merchants 
but Java's biggest and richest entrepreneurs.
Chinese merchants, shopkeepers, and petty traders were also often the first source for 
loans and credit and certainly the last. Most of Java's day-to-day banking was in their 
hands. Most of this activity occurred within the Chinese community, but Dutch and priyayi 
officials also borrowed heavily from them—loans were provided on easy terms in return for 
privileges and favors. In the rural economy, Chinese loans to village farmers and petty 
hawkers fueled the trade of village commodities for store-bought things: threads and yams, 
knives, scissors, mirrors. These debts compromised the Dutch: they bent the priyayi to Chi­
nese interest; and they bound the peasant to the Chinese peddler (and his patrons else­
where), who offered cash and goods on credit secured by the upcoming harvest. Debt, in 
fact, was fundamental to the Chinese economy, inside and out. Alongside employment 
giving and the official status of Chinese officers, debt was a decisive variable in placing each 
individual on his or her step in the pyramidlike formations of patrons and clients that 
formed the invisible skeleton of the community.18
This skeleton took the shape it did in part because of certain distinctive features of the 
Chinese community: first, the prominent role of trade in the Chinese economy, which facili­
tated a division into a chain of credit-giving/debt-paying patrons and clients; second, the 
place within it of economically rooted peranakan Chinese families, on the one hand, and a 
steady flow of newcomers from China on the other. (Chinese singkeh, as the newcomers 
were known, naturally sought jobs among their own people, gravitating first to those with 
similar surnames and home districts. In any case, upon arrival, singkeh would immediately 
have been steered to the Chinese quarter and the office of the Chinese officers, where con­
nections could be made. They needed a patron quickly; without a job they could be sent 
home.)19 But some elements of its structure were uniquely tied to the Dutch colonial house­
hold on Java and the official role of the Chinese within it, namely, as revenue farmers.
16Mindere Welvaart Report: Landbouw 1:152.
17Mindere Welvaart Report: Inlandsch Handel en Nijverheid 4:130.
18The role of credit in the Javan Chinese economy is discussed extensively in contemporary documents. The rela­
tionships connecting petty traders to "big men" are also described. Moreover, some detailed information about 
the dynamics of these debt relationships as they related to the Chinese pecking order comes from Dutch accounts 
of opium farmers who, in crisis, attempted to cover debts to the state by calling in their debts. However, as I have 
remarked elsewhere, it was T'ien Ju-k'ang's study of the Chinese in Sarawak that showed me how debt (and not 
simply monetary debt) disciplined relationships of this kind, that is, through Chinese officer-dominated chains of 
patrons and clients. T'ien Ju-k'ang, The Chinese of Sarawak: A Study of Social Structure, London School of Eco­
nomics and Political Science, Monographs on Social Anthropology (London: 1953).
19J. E. Albrecht, Soerat Ketrangan dari pada hal kaadaan Bangsa Tjina di Negri Hindia Olandia (Batavia: Albrecht en 
Rusche, 1890), p. 5.
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As revenue farmers, Chinese merchants were a critical part of the state apparatus. They 
had been so since the earliest days of Dutch East India Company (VOC) enterprise on Java. 
Over the centuries, the Chinese had delivered vast sums to the colonial treasury through an 
array of franchised or "farmed out" monopolies. By the late nineteenth century, some of 
these had fallen by the wayside, notably the market farm, abolished in 1851 in an attempt to 
weaken the hold of the Chinese on the rural economy. Of those that remained, the opium 
farm was paramount. In most of Java, the others—such as the pig- and cattle-slaughtering 
farms—were invariably subordinate to it, not by official design but as a logical byproduct of 
the way the Chinese economy was shaped by Holland's revenue-farming policies.
As noted, Holland required most of its Chinese subjects to live in ghettos. To move 
beyond them, traders needed passes approved by Chinese officers and invigilated locally by 
priyayi officials. Because of their large and apparently irreplaceable contributions to the 
colonial treasury, however, revenue farms were accorded privileged access to Java's rural 
markets. Farm employees were exempt from the pass and residency rules. They were also 
permitted, with a wink and a nod from local officials, to use coercive techniques to protect 
the farmer's tax-gathering monopolies. In a typical residency, an opium farmer's formal 
organization included several dozen official stores and a small army of Chinese salesmen, 
clerks, and chemists; their work was augmented informally by hundreds of Chinese and 
indigenous vendors who bore opium (and other products) into the villages. Moreover, 
teams of spies and toughs hired by the farm stood by everywhere to muscle aside black- 
market dealers and otherwise to foster the opium farmer's interests.
These interests were legion. Under the protective umbrella of the opium farm, members 
of the farm organization and other clients of the farmers and their kongsi partners traded 
comprehensively throughout the farm territory. Whenever possible, opium farmers gained 
control of the minor revenue farms as well. In the hands of their (Chinese) competitors they 
could be conduits for opium smuggling and other unwelcome commercial competition. In 
such a system, opium farmers' positions within the commercial life of a residency could be 
quite domineering, all the more so when the opium farmers and/or his kongsi partners 
were Chinese officers. And they nearly always were. For these reasons, in much of Java the 
pyramids of patrons and clients that provided the internal structure of the Chinese economy 
(and that also established the pecking order of social position in the community) were either 
linked to the opium farm itself and headed by the farmer and his partners—the dominant 
constellation—or represented competing pyramids (or fragments thereof) headed by the 
farmers' competitors, that is, alternative or potential opium farmers.20
Liem Thian Joe tells us that the peranakan Chinese called the opium farm auctions "the 
battle of the kings." It was not being an opium farmer per se that made men like Be Biauw 
Tjoan and Ho Yam Lo "kings," however, or for that matter, being named Chinese captain or 
major. What really made them big men was their position as paramount patrons of central 
Java's great Chinese commercial networks.
But this power was based, in part, on the colonial system itself. Holland's revenue­
farming policies limited the number of key players and made it possible for a few  men to 
achieve great wealth and influence. Enjoying it meant to be part of the system, to accept the 
basic premise of power on which it was based—Dutch preeminence. And it also meant, 
wherever possible, manipulating the state's institutions and its agents to personal advan­
tage. This was important because, officially speaking, many farm activities were in violation
20There were no opium farms per se in the Priangan or Bantam, although the farmer for Batavia was permitted 
to operate a few stores in Bantam.
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of the state's laws and policies. Almost no real revenue farm adhered strictly to the rules 
and regulations the Dutch set for it; a farmer's agents in the countryside often went beyond 
the powers allotted them by the state, for example, in collecting debts and fending off com­
petitors roughly. And, to speak of more flagrant illegalities, opium farmers routinely 
imported opium to Java independently of the state; that is, they smuggled. To protect these 
activities the Chinese placed themselves as close as possible to local Dutch officials and to 
the priyayi administrators of the countryside. The most advantageous place to be, and the 
safest, was close to power.
And so one witnesses a pattern of behavior among the peranakan "kings" characteristic 
of a dependent elite, constantly and conspicuously currying the favor of other elites: the 
Dutch, who were more powerful than themselves and the Javanese, who were more numer­
ous and permanent. The friendly loans mentioned were but a small aspect of this behavior. 
There were also overt gifts, covert bribes, and a variety of subtler subsidies for officials and 
their establishments. For regents (bupati), wedana, and other priyayi officials, there was free 
opium, plus bonuses for good work done on behalf of the farm or other Chinese interests— 
money to shore up an official's own small retinue of client subordinates and to meet 
obligations to the official's many needy relatives. Chinese obsequiousness to Dutch officials 
was the subject of caricature by the Dutch themselves, and the lavish entertainments at 
which Dutch guests were feted are a matter of record. (In 1866, a senior official from Batavia 
issued this warning to residents, "I have pointed out elsewhere how cautious it behooves 
one to be in regard to the goodwill and obligingness of Chinese Officers or wealthy Chinese, 
who in Java . . .  are everywhere involved in the opium farm.")21
Aside from strategies of this kind—part of the dance of collaboration in which the rela­
tionship between official rules and actual behavior was negotiated among local elites—it is 
worth emphasizing that the Chinese were also physically close to power. They were concen­
trated in the provincial capitals, which were the centers of Dutch administration, and in the 
regional towns, where only a few Dutch were posted and where the priyayi prevailed. The 
seats of bupati, wedana, and assistant wedana were also the sites of opium stores and other 
Chinese-run enterprises—the smaller the town, the more obvious the connection. Moreover, 
court cases related to violations of the revenue farms reveal that collaboration between 
opium farm spies and police agents of local priyayi was commonplace in village Java. From 
top to bottom, the Chinese were close to power and nested within the power structure.
At the same time, however, Chinese activities intersected broadly and regularly with 
Java's criminal world. Interdicting competitors in the countryside required working with 
specialists, as, of course, did opium smuggling. Moreover, certain shadowy realms on the 
fringes of polite society—those of prostitutes, itinerant entertainers, and other denizens of 
the "opium world"—were also part of the Chinese place in nineteenth-century Java. Other 
groups entered these realms selectively and only episodically, but the Chinese moved 
pragmatically within them day by day. Connections like these made Chinese friends useful 
as conspirators—Dutch novels of the times depict both Dutch and Javanese going to them 
for secret undertakings22—but connections also tainted the Chinese and lent an aura of cor­
ruption to their all-too-conspicuous wealth.
21Circular to Residents, December 31,1866, no. 5081, filed in Verbaal Kabinets Geheim, no. 17/C, January 27, 
1869, colonial archives.
22Sec P. A. Daum (Maurits), Ups and Downs of Life in the Indies [1892], trans. Elsje Qualm Sturtevant and Donald 
W. Sturtevant (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987); and Isaac Groneman, Een Ketjoe-geschiedenis, 
Vorstenlanden Toestanden II (Dordrecht: J. P. Revers, 1887).
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Aside from the penniless newcomer, ever present, there were plenty of small-scale ven­
dors and tradespeople among the Chinese whose incomes were modest. Some never rose 
above menial occupations; others toiled all their lives in small shops for small profits. Only a 
few achieved the affluence of the peranakan upper class, the cabang atas. Those who did, 
however, lived ostentatiously in grand "villas" with specially designed gardens, as did the 
Chinese captain mentioned above. They showed off their wealth in lavish parties and in 
largesse to the community. They were borne from place to place in fine horse-drawn car­
riages; and when they walked about at night, attendants bearing lamps and torches walked 
with them. Among the Dutch this wealth was a subject of wonder and notoriety. How much 
more so it must have been to the Javanese, to whom the local Chinese shopkeeper, standing 
amidst his myriad wares, seemed to possess so many things. Even the lowly peddler always 
had money.
A Javanese of the late nineteenth century might well have said, "The Chinese are every­
where with us, but they are not of us"—all the more so because the distinctions bom of legal 
status, dress, residence, occupation, and wealth were reinforced by those of culture itself. 
Peranakan culture was by its very nature one of constant blending and change: formed on 
the one side by a steady flow of men from China and on the other by indigenous or perana­
kan wives and concubines. By the nineteenth century, the pattern of its formation seems to 
have stabilized: Chinese men adhered self-consciously to a sense of Chineseness as mani­
fested in custom, dress, and language and, in the upper reaches, paired in marriage their 
peranakan sons to peranakan daughters of suitable status. Although few peranakan really 
spoke Chinese, their Malay was evidently interlaced with Hokkien words and spoken with 
a "Chinese" accent.23 Merchants, kongsi, and Chinese officers identified themselves by spe­
cial Chinese names and ideographs, and shopkeepers hung from the front of their shops 
cloth banners decorated with lucky Chinese characters. New arrivals from Amoy kept the 
Hokkien dialect alive at a certain rudimentary level among the men. Indeed, the fact that 
until later in the century most singkeh were of Hokkien origin gave the Chineseness of 
peranakan culture a certain homogeneity and facilitated taking in newcomers. For singkeh, 
the vitality of the peranakan-dominated economy and its internal structure based on a 
patronage hierarchy—offering upward mobility to the talented and enterprising—made 
assimilation to peranakan society attractive and in many parts of Java the only practical 
course.
The peranakan "big men," opium farmer-Chinese officers, set a tone of Chineseness for 
the community at large. At the lunar New Year they sponsored great celebrations and dis­
tributed alms. They endowed and maintained temples. (Tan Hong Yan and Be Ing Tjioe, for 
example, together refurbished the temple Tay Kak Sie in Semarang; a few years later when 
their sons Tan Tjong Hoay and Be Biauw Tjoan were named Chinese captains, the cere­
monies of investiture were held there.)24 They also patronized Chinese arts. Some brought 
architects and master craftsmen from China to build their homes and gardens and hired 
Chinese musicians to perform, alongside Javanese gamelan players, for their private plea­
sure. Some of them sent sons to live in the ancestral homeland and otherwise fostered a 
connection with China by acts of charity. China's leaders were aware of this and rewarded 
generous donations with Mandarin titles and honorific robes and hats. In 1873, for example, 
Be Biauw Tjoan was named Mandarin Fourth Class by the emperor of China for his contri-
^The peranakan accent is commented on in the Javanese short story "Tjandoe Peteng Toewin Panjegahipoen," 
which, from the context, was written no later than 1903. In G. W. J. Drewes, Eenvoudig Hedendaagsch Javaansch 
Proza (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1946), pp. 61-71.
24Liem, Riwajat, pp. 104-7,109,116.
22 James Rush
buttons of money and goods to war-ravaged Fukien [Hok Yan] province.25 No less than Li 
Hung-chang approached the Indies government in 1891 asking it to confer special status 
upon its overseas "Mandarins."26
Private education was another link to things Chinese. Dutch officials counted 190 Chi­
nese schools in Java in 1887. In them, some 3,452 pupils learned Chinese bookkeeping and 
memorized "the most important" ideographs. Among Semarang's schoolmasters were 
degree holders from China—or, more likely, failed degree candidates. But observers noted 
that such rote learning provided little understanding of the language; moreover, girls rarely 
attended such schools.27
Indeed, in this show of peranakan Chineseness the role of women was largely ornamen­
tal. Liem complains that peranakan men of the times paid little attention to their daughters, 
so the girls were influenced exclusively by the female side of the family, that is, by their 
peranakan or indigenous mothers and grandmothers and by indigenous servants. That 
these women spoke no Chinese meant that both daughters and sons spoke Javanese or 
Malay as their mother tongue—one reason that command of Chinese atrophied so quickly 
from one generation to the next. Indigenous wives of Chinese men wore local clothing; so, 
too, did peranakan women, who preferred sarong and kebaya. (Ladies of the cabang atas, 
however, complemented their finery with silks and other adornments from China, one rea­
son, as Skinner has remarked, that "no one could mistake the Peranakan ensemble for the 
Javanese.")28 In other ways as well, Liem tells us, women of the Chinese community 
adopted local custom, as in filing their teeth and chewing betel. It should be noted that out­
side the cabang atas, where women seem to have lived in seclusion, women very likely 
worked alongside their men in shops and stalls, providing them with critical links to their 
customers. (This is especially interesting in light of the prominent role of Javanese and 
Sundanese women in rural marketing generally.)
Thus did the Chinese community form, and re-form, itself in each generation between 
the self-conscious Chineseness of its men and the Java-ness of its women. By the late nine­
teenth century, this complex social chemistry had long since yielded a distinct culture. Like 
the society itself—poised between Dutch and native, city and countryside, legality and ille­
gality—its place in Java was also one in between, to the Javanese and other indigenes at 
once familiar and strange.
The evolving peranakan culture was an important source of cohesion among the Chi­
nese of Java, reinforcing other ties of presumed kinship among Hokkien, of special legal 
status, and of the mechanisms of social control built into the Chinese economy and exagger­
ated by the Chinese officer system and government revenue farming. But Java was changing 
rapidly in the late nineteenth century, subjecting the cohesion of the community to new 
strains. Ironically, rising prosperity was one of these. The opening of Java to private enter­
prise in 1870, the year after the Suez Canal opened, set off a fresh round of development on 
the island. European planters opened new lands to commercial agriculture for sugar, 
tobacco, and coffee. This expansion was accompanied by government-sponsored schemes to 
build roads and railroads, bridges, dikes, irrigation channels, and harbor works. The Chi­
nese moved quickly to take up new opportunities, penetrating regions of the interior now
25De Indier, December 6,1873, p. 1039.
26Minister of colonies to the governor general, January 7,1892, no. 24/43, filed in Verbaal Kabinets Geheim, no. 
24/43, January 7,1892, colonial archives.
27Koloniaal Verslag, 1889, p. 120.
28Skinner, "Java's Chinese Minority," p. 257.
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awakening to enterprise and moving in larger numbers to frontier territories in the East 
Hook.29 Many of the richest became planters themselves; Chinese outnumbered Europeans 
in acquiring long-term land leases from the Javanese.30 Otherwise, Chinese merchants sup­
plied the nuts and bolts to carry out infrastructure projects and contracted with the Dutch to 
build warehouses, haul produce, and provision construction crews and plantation laborers. 
The vast numbers of people now abandoning villages to provide the raw muscle for all this 
expansion—and who earned wages in money to do so—swelled the ranks of opium smok­
ers and profits to opium farmers. As word of this boon spread to south China, increasing 
numbers of men made their way to Java, raising the number of singkeh seeking places 
within the peranakan-dominated economy. Of these new arrivals, a growing number were 
Hakka and other non-Hokkien.
The massive rural depression of the mid-1880s knocked the wind out of this boom and 
strained the Chinese community. Losses to Chinese-run revenue farms were catastrophic to 
the peranakan elite, many of whom lost their farms and their fortunes; this in turn provoked 
a partial breakdown along Java's Chinese patron-client chains. Very likely, competition 
among them for the spoils of the countryside also became rougher because the same years 
were accompanied by a rising tide of complaints by Dutch observers of Chinese cheating, 
usury, and racketeering. For newcomers there were no patrons, and as singkeh now scram­
bled to wrest a living from money-scarce Java they found the peranakan authority struc­
ture—so close to power—an impediment to survival. In Yogyakarta, in 1889, they rebelled 
against it.31 Such behavior made the "singkeh flood" visible to the Dutch. Seeing it amidst 
other evidence of Chinese danger to the colony, a few of them raised the flag of Yellow Peril 
and led an anti-Chinese campaign that resulted, a few years later, in dismantling the gov­
ernment revenue farms.
The full impact of all this on the Chinese community was not immediate. Java's econ­
omy recovered in the wake of the mid-1880s crisis and so did that of the peranakan. Many 
of the major opium farmers did not recover. The losers were replaced by competitors from 
within the cabang atas, the most astute and successful of whom was Oei Tiong Ham. Java's 
Chinese-run opium farms were dismantled gradually, beginning in 1894; by 1905 there were 
none on Java. The minor revenue farms were replaced more or less at the same time. These 
changes comported with the Ethical perception that Chinese business practices were a cause 
of poverty among the Javanese. In tune with this, the enforcement of residence and pass 
regulations was especially harsh in those years.
Java's Chinese community was, therefore, under duress as it entered the twentieth cen­
tury and was deprived of an institution essential to the structure of its economy and to its 
social cohesion. As noted, the real power of Chinese officers rested upon their position as 
senior patrons of the peranakan economy. As the huge farm-based patronage pyramids 
headed by them fragmented and broke down in the late 1890s and early 1900s, the authority 
of the officers could not be sustained by Dutch-conferred titles alone. (Soon, bedecked in 
Dutch military-style costumes with ribbons and braids, they would became symbols of 
unquestioning deference.) These changes undermined the authority of the peranakan elite 
as cultural arbiters as well, all the more so as new waves of non-Hokkien singkeh arrived in 
the colony and formed local communities independent of the peranakan, communities with
29See C. Baks, "De Chinezen in Oostelijk Java, een demografisch onderzoek naar de penetratie over de periode 
1815-1930," Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, Typescript, 1962.
30See Koloniaal Verslag, 1885, p. 77.
3*See Isaac Groneman, lift en over Midden-Java (Zutphen: W. J. Thieme en Cie., 1891), pp. 297-306.
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wholly different standards for Chineseness. For almost the first time, Chinese women joined 
Chinese men in Java to form "pure" Chinese families. (A similar "pure" community was 
now forming among the Dutch as well. Both were called totok.)
In the 1880s, the peranakan had begun exploring new standards of Chineseness them­
selves—judged at least by the sudden popularity of Confucian primers and popular Chinese 
novels published in Malay. Alienated from and unattracted to the low-class Chineseness of 
the totok, many peranakan looked instead to China for models. Some joined the Confucian 
revival and helped to form the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan in 1900 and other "modem" Chinese 
organizations. At the same time, peranakan were becoming attuned to winds of modernity 
blowing from the West. They began learning Dutch in earnest (and English). They cut off 
their braids and began to wear Western-style clothing, some of them even before it was 
permitted. And many of them began to gravitate to the more genteel professions, abandon­
ing the hurly-burly of commerce, a realm that was gradually overtaken by the totok. Oei 
Tiong Ham's legendary success was an exception among the peranakan.
In short, as the new century begins, we find Java's Chinese making a new place for 
themselves. It was a more fragmented place, because the community itself was becoming 
very rapidly diverse. And it was a more ambiguous place, especially for peranakan now 
tom between the attractions of Western modernity, to be learned from the Dutch, and their 
self-conscious identity as Chinese. Most of all, it was a more vulnerable place, for the 
Chinese were no longer close to power. Even though the Chinese officer system survived 
officially until the early 1930s, long before then—indeed, from the turn of the century— 
peranakan and totok alike needed to mobilize themselves in new ways. They did so 
successfully. New Chinese organizations provoked important reforms—the residence and 
pass regulations went out; Dutch-Chinese schools came in. But the institutional context in 
which this transition was accomplished was wholly changed.
The Chinese now faced the state as outsiders. Even after the Dutch departed, half a cen­
tury later, it remained so. The most calamitous event of the period for Java's Chinese was 
not their altered status within the colonial state. It was, instead, the coincidence of a power­
ful wavepf sinophobia—prompting the Dutch to dismantle the revenue farms and, in part, 
to launch the "Ethical Policy"—with the embryonic stages of the Indonesian nationalist 
movement, a movement whose heirs would build the new state and decide who, exactly, 
was truly Indonesian. And who was not.
